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RECENT CASE
Torts, Wrongful Conception, Measuring the Damages Incurred by the Par-
ents of an Unplanned Child; Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169
(Minn. Sup. Ct. 1977).
In Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic I the Supreme Court of Minnesota re-
cently held that parents could recover the costs of raising a child whose
conception followed a negligently performed sterilization. The court further
held that the future value of the child's aid, comfort and society should be
calculated and used as an offset to this award. 2 By recognizing this cause of
action, the Sherlock court joined a growing number of courts 3 that have
shown similar respect for the right of the individual to limit procreation and
to be compensated for the birth of an unplanned child.
Plaintiff Eugene Sherlock underwent a vasectomy following the birth of
his seventh child. After being informed that the results of a post-operative
semen test were negative, the Sherlocks resumed sexual relations. Fourteen
months later Mrs. Sherlock gave birth to a healthy baby boy. Thereafter, the
Sherlocks initiated the present negligence action seeking damages for the
medical expenses incident to the birth, the pain and suffering caused to Mrs.
Sherlock during her pregnancy and delivery, the loss of consortium resulting
to Mr. Sherlock, and the costs of supporting and educating the child to the
age of majority. 4  The case was submitted upon general negligence instruc-
tions, and the jury returned an award of $19,500 for the plaintiffs. 5  The
Minnesota Supreme Court 6 affirmed but remanded the case with instruc-
tions that the award be reduced by the future value of the child's aid, com-
fort and society. 7
1. 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1977).
2. Id. at 176.
3. See, e.g., cases cited, notes 22-24 and accompanying text infra.
4. 260 N.W.2d at 171. Vasectomy involves the cutting and ligation of the vas deferens
tubes that carry sperm from the testicles. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1723 (rev. 4th ed.
1968). Since a small percentage of vasectomies will fail because of spontaneous recanalization of
these tubes, this action and most actions for unsuccessful vasectomies allege negligence in post-
operative care. See Bravenec, Voluntary Sterilization as a Crime: Applicability of Assault and
Battery and of Mayhem, 6 J. FAM. L. 94, 106-07 (1966); Lombard, Vasectomy, 10 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 25, 32-33 (1975).
5. 260 N.W.2d at 171. The general negligence instruction allows recovery for all damages
proximately resulting from the defendant's negligence. See, e.g., ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY IN-
STRUC'rIONS-CIVIL §§ 30.01-30.16 (2d ed. 1971). In contrast, the Sherlock court limited re-
covery by remanding the case so that a special verdict form with explanatory instructions could
be used. 260 N.W.2d at 176.
6. The case was tried in district court. Therefore, under Minnesota law it was appealable
directly to the Supreme Court of Minnesota. See MINN. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(a).
7. 260 N.W.2d at 176.
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This Note will trace the history of the cause of action for "wrongful con-
ception"" and discuss the rationale employed by the Sherlock court in rec-
ognizing this cause of action and in affirming the award of damages for the
costs of raising the child. Further, the Note will criticize the court's instruc-
tion that benefits be determined and used as an offset to this award and will
propose alternative methods for awarding damages in such an action.
The rationale of the courts that have denied recovery for negligent sterili-
zation (wrongful conception) first was expressed in the dicta of Christensen
v. Thornby.9 In noting that "the plaintiff has been blessed with the father-
hood of another child," ' 0 the court voiced the public policy argument that a
parent should not be awarded damages for the birth of a healthy child. This
theme was expressed next in Shaheen v. Knight," where the court held that
to recognize a cause of action for the normal birth of a healthy child would
be "foreign to the universal public sense of the people."' 2
The first cases to challenge the Shaheen precedent recognized a cause of
action for negligent sterilization but limited damages to the immediate costs
of the operation and childbirth. 13  The possibility of further recovery was
8. The Sherlock court was the first to use this term to describe a cause of action arising
from the negligence of a physician or pharmacist in sterilization or administration of contracep-
tives. hd. at 174-75. In labelling the present case a wrongful conception action, the court at-
tempted to distinguish these facts from those of cases given the similar titles, "wrongful life"
and "wrongful birth."
A wronglul life action is brought by an illegitimate child against a parent or by a deformed
child against a doctor who failed to detect either pregnancy or disease in the expectant mother.
The courts have refused to allow recovery, noting the impossibility of measuring the damages
suffered by being born against the alternative of non-existence. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49
N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967) (a deformed child seeking damages from a physician who had failed
to inform his mother of the possible adverse effects of German measles during pregnancy);
Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis.2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974) (an illegitimate son suing his father).
A wrongful birth action is brought by a parent against a physician whose negligence occurred
during a post-conception examination. The plaintiff usually will contend that she would have
had an abortion had she been informed of the pregnancy or of the disease that endangered the
health of the fetus. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967) (recovery denied
for costs of raising a deformed child); Jacobs v. Thiemer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1975)
(recovery allowed for medical expenses incident to raising a deformed child).
9. 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934). The Christensen case is not analogous to Sherlock
nor with the cases that cite to its influential dicta. The suit was brought for misrepresentation
rather than negligence. The plaintiff was seeking damages for his anxiety over the health of his
pregnant wife and for the expenses of delivery. In sustaining a demurrer to the plaintiff's com-
plaint, the court was not confronted with the issue of damages.
10. Id. at 126, 255 N.W. at 622.
11. 6 Lyc. 19, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (1957).
12. Id. at 23, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d at 45.
13. In Milde v. Leigh, 75 N.D. 418, 28 N.W.2d 530 (1947), the court held that a husband
had a cause of action for loss of consortium and costs of childbirth after a negligently performed
sterilization of his wife. Likewise, in West v. Underwood, 132 N.J.L. 325, 40 A.2d 610 (1945),
it was held that a husband was entitled to recover for physical and mental pain and suffering as
well as for loss of services proximately resulting from his wife's need of a second operation after
a first sterilization had failed.
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extended in a 1966 Illinois case that allowed damages for the medical ex-
penses and special care of a retarded child.1 4  One year later, the California
Court of Appeals in Custodio v. Bauer 15 rejected the policy barriers im-
posed by Christensen and Shaheen. The Custodio court recognized a cause
of action for negligent sterilization and the possibility of recovering the costs
of raising the child 16 by employing a standard negligence formula for the
assessment of damages. 17
The issue of damages was refined in Troppi v. Scarf,18 in which a Michigan
court allowed compensation for the costs of raising the child but limited this
recovery by applying the "benefits rule" of section 920 of the Restatement of
Torts. 19 According to this rule, a defendant can mitigate damages by intro-
ducing evidence of the benefits which will result from the tortious act. As
applied to an action for negligent sterilization, the value of the child's com-
panionship and service is to be computed and deducted from the gross
award of the costs of raising the child. 20
The impact of Custodio and Troppi is evidenced by the holdings of courts
that subsequently have addressed claims for negligent sterilization. Although
a small number of these courts have denied recovery out of respect for the
policy arguments established in Shaheen and Christensen,21 a majority have
14. Doerr v. Villate, 74 I11. App.2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (2d Dist. 1966). The sterilization
followed the birth of two retarded children. This action was brought when a third retarded child
was born. The court did not specifically address the policy arguments of courts which had
denied recovery. However, by holding that the five year statute of limitations for an oral con-
tract applied rather than the two year personal injury limitation period, the court acknowledged
that the plaintiffs complaint went beyond personal injuries suffered by her and that her claim
for the special care and medical expenses of the retarded child was actionable.
15. 251 Cal. App.2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
16. Id. at 324-25, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477. Although the court was not confronted with the issue
of damages, it did state that the plaintiffs were entitled to more than nominal damages and that
compensation was appropriate to replenish the family wealth depleted by the new member.
17. Id. at 325, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477. The court noted "[t]hat if tortious conduct is estab-
lished, the law provides: 'For the breach of an obligation . . . the measure of damages .. . is
the amount which will compensate for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it
could have been anticipated or not.' " Id. quoting CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3333 (West 1970).
18. 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971). The conception followed from a pharma-
cist's negligent administration of tranquilizers in a prescription for oral contraceptives.
19. The "benefits rule" as defined in the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 920 (1939), provides:
"Where the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his property and
in so doing has conferred upon the plaintiff a special benefit to the interest which was harmed,
the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, where this is equita-
ble." See also C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES 146 (1935).
20. The Sherlock court instructed that "the trier of fact will then be required to reduce
these costs by the value of the child's aid, comfort, and society which will benefit the parents
for the duration of their lives." 260 N.W.2d at 176.
21. See, e.g., Clegg v. Chase, 89 Misc.2d 510, 391 N.Y.S.2d 966 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (recovery
denied for public policy reasons); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973)
(recovery denied for public policy reasons and due to insurmountable problems of proof in
computing the expenses and benefits of raising a child).
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recognized this cause of action.2 2 A number of these courts allowed recov-
ery for the costs of raising the child, 23 while several also followed the Troppi
The Terrell decision has been limited by Garwood v. Locke, 552 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977), a recent Texas case that interpreted Terrell as recognizing a cause of action for negligent
sterilization but limiting recovery to the immediate damages incident to pregnancy and birth.
The Clegg decision has limited significance because of confusion among various New York hold-
ings. The decision criticized two earlier New York cases that allowed recovery for all damages
provable by the plaintiff. See Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc.2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Sup. Ct.
1974) (a negligent sterilization); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 App. Div.2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265
(1974) (failure to detect pregnancy).
The Cox and Ziemnba courts had distinguished an earlier New York case, Stewart v. Long
Island College Hosp., 58 Misc.2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (Sup. Ct. 1968), modified and aff'd as
modified, 35 App. Div.2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 695, 332 N.Y.S.2d
640, 283 N.E.2d 616 (1972) (recovery denied in an action for negligent failure to recommend an
abortion for a mother who had contracted a disease while pregnant) as having been decided
while abortions were illegal in the state. Accordingly, the plaintiff could not have legally termi-
nated her pregnancy even if the physician had properly detected it. The Clegg court cited two
recent decisions that held Stewart to be good law, thus rejecting the basis of the Cox and
Ziemba decisions. Greenberg v. Kliot, 47 App. Div.2d 765, 367 N.Y.S.2d 966, appeal denied,
37 N.Y.2d 707, 375 N.Y.S.2d 1026, 337 N.E.2d 618 (1975) and Johnson v. Yeshiva Univ., 53
App. Div.2d 523, 384 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1976). The most recent New York decision, however, has
recognized a cause of action for negligent sterilization and allowed recovery for the costs of
raising the child. Rivera v. New York, 46 U.S.L.W. 2586 (N.Y. Ct. Cls. April 28, 1978).
See also Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1975) (the court recognized a cause
of action for negligent sterilization but held that a person's value precluded recovery of the costs
of support); Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash.2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964) (the court affirmed a jury's
finding that benefits outweighed costs).
Courts denying recovery in wrongful birth cases involving the failure of a physician to detect
either pregnancy or disease in a post-conception examination of an expectant mother have also
relied on the Christensen and Shaheen logic. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 31, 227
A.2d 689, 693 (1967) ("the right of their child to live is greater than and precludes their right
not to endure emotional and financial injury"); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis.2d 514,
518, 219 N.W.2d 242, 244 (1974) ("every contribution by the child . . . is to remain with the
mother and father").
22. The Sherlock court noted that the courts recognizing this cause of action presently rep-
resent a majority position. 260 N.W.2d at 174. Included in this majority are courts that did not
discuss the issue of damages but nevertheless recognized the plaintiff's cause of action for negli-
gent sterilization. See, e.g., Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F.Supp 460 (S.D. W.Va. 1967) (the court
awarded the plaintiff's claim for minimal damages); Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377 (Ky.
Sup. Ct. 1971) (the trial court's directed verdict for defendant was held to be reversible error);
Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977) (by denying an informed consent defense the
court recognized the plaintiff's cause of action); Vaughn v. Shelton, 514 S.W.2d 870 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1974) (the trial court's directed verdict for defendant was held to be reversible error). See
also cases cited note 23 and accompanying text infra.
23. Courts impliedly or expressly permitting recovery of the costs of raising the wrongfully
conceived child include: Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 126, 366 A.2d 204 (Super. Ct.
1976) (allowing recovery for all provable damages stemming from negligent sterilization); Jackson
v. Anderson, 230 So.2d 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (same); Green v. Sudakin, 81 Mich. App.
545, 265 N.W.2d 411 (1978) (adhering strictly to the state's Troppi precedent); Betancourt v.
Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975) (allowing recovery for all provable damages
stemming from negligent sterilization); Rivera v. New York, 46 U.S.L.W. 2586 (N.Y. Ct. Cls.
April 28, 1978) (noting United States Supreme Court protection of the right to limit family size);
Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc.2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (allowing recovery for all
[Vol. 28:1
RECENT CASE
holding by applying the benefits rule to offset this award.2 4  The Sherlock
decision is in keeping with this trend.
In reaching its decision, the Sherlock court first had to refute the policy
arguments advanced by past courts in denying recovery.2 5  These courts
held that the award of damages for the normal birth of a healthy child was
inappropriate for two reasons: the primary purpose of marriage was to have
children,2 6 and the benefits to be derived from a child necessarily would
outweigh the costs of its support.2 7  The Sherlock court noted a modern
attitude toward parenthood that had rendered these policy arguments obso-
lete. Responding to the notion that it was the marital province to "be fruitful
and multiply," 2 8 the court noted recent legislative,2 9 judicial, 30 and social 31
recognition of the right of a married couple to limit reproduction. Address-
ing the argument that the benefits of parenthood were necessarily greater
than the costs, the court held that in light of modern social attitudes toward
procreation, 32 it would be inappropriate to declare that benefits exceed costs
as a matter of law. 33
provable damages); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976) (allowing
recovery of $450,000 for the birth of a deformed child following an unsuccessful sterilization).
24. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 126, 366 A.2d 204 (Super. Ct. 1976);
Green v. Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 545, 265 N.W.2d 411 (1978) (the court was not confronted
with application of the benefits rule, but it affirmed the use of the Troppi court's damage
formula); Rivera v. New York, 46 U.S.L.W. 2586 (N.Y. Ct. Cls. April 28, 1978).
25. See generally cases cited notes 9-12 & 21 and accompanying text supra.
26. For example, in Shaheen the court noted that "[t]he great end of matrimony is not the
comfort and convenience of the immediate parties .. .but the procreation of a progeny having
a legal title to maintenance by the father." Shaheen v. Knight, 6 Lyc. 19, 23, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d
41, 45 (1957) quoting Matchin v. Matchin, 6 Pa. 332, 337 (1847).
27. See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 13 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1975) ("the value of a
human life outweighs any 'damage' which might be said to follow from the fact of birth"); Ball v.
Mudge, 64 Wash.2d 247, 250, 391 P.2d 201, 204 (1964) ("the cost incidental to such birth was
far outweighed by the blessing of a cherished child").
28. 260 N.W.2d at 175, quoting Genesis 1:28.
29. The court noted Minnesota statutes legalizing the sale of contraceptives and providing
subsidies for community family planning services. 260 N.W.2d at 175 n.10. See also 42 U.S.C.
§ 300 (1970) (The Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970).
30. The court noted United States Supreme Court holdings protecting the right of the indi-
vidual to limit procreation. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (the state may not infringe on an
individual's right to have an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (the state may not infringe on a married couple's right to use
contraceptives in order to limit family size); 260 N.W.2d at 175.
In Brodie, Marital Procreation, 49 ORE. L. REV. 245 (1970), the Griswold decision was in-
terpreted as constitutionally protecting a married couple's right to a sexual relationship as an
end in itself. Id. at 254. This attitude is in stark contrast to that expressed in Shaheen. See note
26 supra.
31. The court cited statistics indicating that 3,566,000 men chose to be stbrilized in the
United States during the first five years of this decade. 260 N.W.2d at 175 n.9. See also Shaw,
Procreation and the Population Problem, 55 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1170 n.33 (1977), where the
author noted a 210% increase in the number of sterilizations since 1969.
32. See notes 29-31 supra.
33. 260 N.W.2d at 175. The generalization that benefits will exceed costs is especially inap-
propriate in an action for negligent sterilization where the plaintiff has made a conscious deci-
1978]
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In light of the foregoing considerations, the court recognized the plaintiff's
cause of action for negligent sterilization.14  However, by holding that this
action was indistinguishable from other medical negligence actions, the court
found itself bound by the rules of negligence to extend recovery beyond the
minimal costs of pregnancy and childbirth and to allow recovery for the costs
of raising the child.3 5  Due to the court's reluctance in allowing this gener-
ous recovery, 36 and perhaps in sympathy with the policy reasons advanced
by courts in denying recovery, the case was remanded with instructions that
the award be reduced by the value of the child's aid, comfort, and soci-
ety. 3 7
This instructed use of the benefits rule, though precedented, 3 seems in-
appropriate in an action for negligent sterilization. A close reading of the
rule indicates that the defendant must have conferred upon the plaintiff a
benefit to the interest which was harmed.3 9 Case law has placed further
sion not to bear a child and has undergone surgical procedure to insure against it. As stated in
Note, Elective Sterilization, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 415 (1964), "[tihe difficulty with using the
benefits of parenthood to offset the financial costs is the failure to recognize that, for the seg-
ment of the community which resorts to sterilization, the values of having a child do not out-
weigh financial or other considerations." Id. at 435.
34. 260 N.W.2d at 174.
35. Id. citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 41-42 (4th ed. 1971) (a
discussion of causation in fact and proximate cause) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. If the de-
fendant's negligence is the proximate cause of the injury, he is legally responsible for all conse-
quences which follow in an unbroken sequence from the negligent act. Christianson v. Chicago,
St.P., M.&O. Ry. 67 Minn. 94, 97, 69 N.W. 640, 641 (1896).
36. The court noted that it was "compelled" to do so "in obedience to the rule of law." 260
N.W.2d at 176. The court further expressed its reluctance by noting that it was "pretermitting
moral and theological considerations" in allowing the recovery of all costs resulting from the
negligence. Id. at 174.
37. 260 N.W.2d at 176.
38. The Sherlock court cited Troppi for its refinement of the damage formula and its appli-
cation of the benefits rule in a case involving negligent sterilization. 260 N.W.2d at 173-74.
Troppi, however, has been criticized for misapplying the rule. See Note, Misfeasance in the
Pharmacy: A Bundle of "Fun, Joy and Affection?", 8 CALIF. W. L. REV. 341, 343-46 (1972) (the
benefit should not be determined from defendant's allegations, for the child may not be a
benefit to the plaintiff); Note, Determination of Damages for the Negligent Dispensing of an
Oral Contraceptive Resulting in the Birth of an Unwanted Child, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1221,
1231-34 (1972) (benefits of companionship should not be an element of computing loss for eco-
nomic damages).
Further, facts peculiar to the Troppi case were cited by the court as justifying its use of the
benefits rule. The negligent act was a pharmacist's error in filling a prescription for oral con-
traceptives. The court heralded the flexibility provided by the benefits rule, noting that "[w]hat
must be appreciated is the diversity of purposes and circumstances of the women who use oral
contraceptives." 31 Mich. App. 240, 256, 187 N.W.2d 511, 518. The court's examples included
unmarried women seeking to presently remain childless, married women seeking to delay
childbearing, and women seeking to remain permanently childless. Id. In contrast, all persons
seeking sterilization do so with the intention of permanently ceasing reproduction.
39. See note 19 supra. This limitation on the application of the benefits rule is explained in
the comments to section 920: "Limitation to Same Interest. Damages resulting from an invasion of
one interest are not diminished by showing that another interest has been benefited." RESTATE-
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restrictions on application of the rule by requiring that the tort produce
immediate, material benefits.4 0  In the present case, the negligent act
caused harm to the pecuniary interests of the plaintiff, and the defendant
was allowed to offset these damages by alleging speculative future benefits to
a different interest: the emotional and psychological rewards of par-
enthood.4
1
It appears that the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts section
920 intended to emphasize these limitations on application of the benefits
rule. The tentative draft makes one addition to the first Restatement: "The
rule stated in this section . . . is intended primarily to restrict the injured
person's recovery to the harm which he actually incurred and not to permit
MENT OF TORTS, § 920, comment b (1939). To illustrate this principle, the authors note that
where A charges B with murder, and B sues for defamation and claims no special damages, the
defendant, A, cannot show in mitigation that the business of B, a seller of soft drinks, has been
increased as the result of A's false charge through publicity. Damages for harm to reputation are
not diminished by a showing that the earning capacity of the plaintiff was increased by the
defendant's tortious act. Id. at Illustration 4.
40. See Thompson v. Town of Ft. Branch, 204 Ind. 152, 178 N.E. 440 (1931) in which the
defendant attempted to show that future expenses saved by the decedent's parents were greater
than the value of lost services. The court noted that "the [benefits] rule . . . has been carefully
restricted to situations in which the wrongful act is in itself an advantage to the plaintiff or
results in an actual, present material benefit." Id. at 165, 178 N.E. at 444-45; Samples v.
Kansas City Rys., 232 S.W. 1049 (Mo. Ct. App. 1921) in which the court rejected the defend-
ant's attempted use of the benefits rule to reduce the award of a newspaper boy whose leg was
severed. The benefits of a crippled person's increased paper sales were held to be speculative
future benefits.
See also Sheppard, Negligent Interference With Birth Control Practices, 11 S. TEx. L.J. 229,
239 (1969) where the author interprets this limitation on use of the benefits rule as requiring
that "[tihere must be such a direct connection between the benefit and the injury that they
constitute the constituent components which are compared in arriving at the net damages
.. .. Id.
41. In the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 920, comment a, Illustrations I & 2 (1939) the au-
thors give examples of proper application of the benefits rule. If a surgeon performs an unau-
thorized operation resulting in pain, it may be shown that other pain was averted; if the opera-
tion has destroyed a bodily organ, it may be shown that other bodily functions were improved.
Id. In these examples, the plaintiff has received a simultaneous, material benefit to the interest
which was harmed.
Although Sherlock relied on the Custodio holding in allowing recovery, it failed to recognize
that Custodio had observed that the benefits rule contemplated a benefit to the interest that
was harmed. That court held that the plaintiff could recover for the mental or physical pain
incident to her pregnancy (the legal action was initiated while the plaintiff was still pregnant)
and that the recovery could be limited only if the pregnancy produced corresponding benefits to
her emotional make-up or to any infirmities in her physical well being. Custodio v. Bauer, 251
Cal. App.2d 303, 322-23, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476 (1967).
There were possibilities for proper application of the "same interest" test in Sherlock. The
value of the child's comfort could have been used to offset damages for alleged emotional in-
juries. Or, to offset the Sherlocks' recovery for the costs of raising the child, the defendant
could have introduced evidence of the future pecuniary value of the child's services. However,
the value of this comfort and service would still not be the immediate, material benefit con-
templated by case law. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
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the tortfeasor to force a benefit upon him against his will" 4 2 (emphasis
added). The Sherlocks wanted no more children. By having their recovery
for the costs of raising their wrongfully conceived child reduced by the value
of the rewards to be derived from the child, they were having a benefit
forced upon them against their will.
The original award should not have been offset, not only because of these
limitations on the use of the benefits rule, but also because of insurmount-
able problems in proving prospective benefits to the required degree of cer-
tainty.4 3 The Sherlock court dismissed the notion that benefits would be
difficult to assess, noting that such assessment routinely is made in wrongful
death actions.4 4 There exist, however, problems of proof in a wrongful con-
ception action that make this analogy inappropriate. In proving a wrongful
death case, the plaintiff can and should introduce evidence of the compan-
ionship and services provided by the child during its life so that an approxi-
mation of the future value of those lost benefits can be made.4 5  In contrast,
the jury's estimate of future benefits in an action for negligent sterilization
lacks the necessary basis for reasonable approximation of damages because
there is no evidence of the child's moral and intellectual character. Fur-
thermore, the skeletal jury instruction that the Sherlock court approved for
use in computing benefits enhances this legal fiction in that it provides no
guidelines to assist the jury in its determination of future benefits.4 6
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 920, comment f (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). Case
law further supports the notion that no person should be forced to accept benefits against his
will. See, e.g., Tillotson v. Smith, 32 N.H. 90, 96 (1855) ("no infringement of rights can be
justified on the ground that the act is a benefit to the owner, if it is done against his will");
Merritt v. Parker, 1 N.J.L. 526, 533 (1795) ("it is as illegal to force him to receive a benefit as
to submit him to an injury").
43. It is a basic rule of recovery that prospective damages must be proven with a reasonable
degree of certainty. Watt v. Nevada Cent. Ry., 23 Nev. 154, 44 P. 423 (1896). Accordingly,
prospective benefits must also be capable of reasonable approximation, for in a case applying the
benefits rule the value of these future benefits is an essential element in determining net recov-
ery.
44. 260 N.W.2d at 176.
45. See 4 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 71, Death, Action for, Proof 7 (1960) where factors for
determining the value of the child's companionship are noted: "Harmonious ... family relations
between the parties involved should be shown, as well as common interest in hobbies, scholar-
ship .. . and the like." Id. This is followed by a checklist of traits relating to the child's rela-
tionship with his family and his disposition toward rendering aid and comfort.
Factors for determining the value of the child's services are also listed. "Essential also is proof
of the physical and mental condition of the minor just prior to death" (emphasis added). Id. at
Proof 9. This is followed by a checklist of traits relating to the intelligence, moral character and
tractability of the child. See generally 1 SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 530-36
(1975); Decof, Damages in Actions for Wrongful Death of Children, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW 197
(1971).
46. In requiring use of a special verdict form, the Sherlock court cited Martineau v. Nelson,
247 N.W.2d 409, 417 n.18 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1977) which approved the trial court's use of a
special form. 260 N.W.2d at 176 n.14. This form reads in relevant part: "What is the value of
the affection, love, care and services of David to Jean Martineau $ , to Larry
Martineau? $ ." Martineau v. Nelson, 247 N.W.2d 409, 414 (Minn. Sup. Ct.
1977).
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In view of the apparent misapplication of the benefits rule in the present
case, the most logical alternative for awarding damages would be to allow
blanket recovery for the costs of raising the child. This recovery would leave
the plaintiffs whole by replenishing depleted family wealth. 47 Further, such
awards would be consistent since the total would not be subject to a case by
case jury approximation of offsetting benefits.
A second alternative would be to employ a special negligence instruction
that considered the purpose of the sterilization and family circumstances in
determining the actual damage caused by the negligent act. This instruction
would allow the jury to distinguish the jobless father of six who elects sterili-
zation in an effort to extend family resources, from the mother who seeks
sterilization out of distaste for the phyical complications suffered in a previ-
ous pregnancy and childbirth. In such cases the father would be entitled to
recover the costs of raising the child; while the mother, whose motivations
were primarily related to physical discomfort, would be able to recover only
for her pain and suffering.
In keeping with modern attitudes toward parenthood and the individual's
right to limit procreation, the Sherlock court appropriately recognized a
cause of action for negligent sterilization. Two notable social effects of such
recognition are foreseeable. The community should benefit from improved
medical care due to the fear of liability imposed by the decision, for judicial
recognition of liability for medical negligence will promote stricter adherence
to professional standards of care in future sterilization operations. 48  The
decision, however, could produce a detrimental effect of equal significance.
Given the opportunity, greedy parents and lawyers could pursue this cause
of action without considering the silent interests of the child. 49  Hopefully,
47. The birth of the unplanned child could impose a substantial financial burden on its
parents. See, e.g., PROSSER, supra note 35, at 909 n.ll and accompanying text. Accordingly,
the Custodio court noted that the purpose of this cause of action was to "replenish the family
exchequer." Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App.2d 303, 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 477 (1967) citing
Doerr v. Villate, 74 II1. App.2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (2d Dist. 1966). See generally Baerwald,
The Family as an Economic Unit, 24 FORDHAM L. REV. 116 (1955).
48. See, e.g., PROSSER, supra note 35, at 23, where it is noted that "[wihen the decisions of
the courts become known, and defendants realize that they may be held liable, there is of
course a strong incentive to prevent the occurrence of the harm."
49. It is possible that the child would be rendered an "emotional bastard" upon learning of
the circumstances surrounding its conception and birth. See, e.g., Note, The Birth of a Child
Following an Ineffective Sterilization Operation as Legal Damage, 9 UTAH L.REv. 808, 811-12
(1965). But see Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App.2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) where the
court noted that this child would have no greater emotional injury that the child who learned
that his existence was the result of his parents' ineptitude at birth control, Id. at 324-25, 59 Cal.
Rptr. at 477. The court further noted that "one cannot ...say whether the [child] will be more
emotionally upset if he arrives ...where [others] must contribute to his support, or whether
he will have a happier and more well-adjusted life if he brings with him the wherewithal to
make it possible." Id. at 325, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
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potential litigants would consider all such repurcussions before initiating an
action for negligent sterilization.
Thomas M. Fahey
In Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So.2d 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970), the court noted that the
action stemmed from the birth of an "unplanned child," not an "unwanted child." Id. The
possibility of emotional injury would be reduced if all parties maintained a similar perspective
and litigation was concentrated on the plaintiff's economic injury. See note 47 supra.
